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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we present the results of a roleplay survey 
instrument administered to 1001 online survey respondents 
to study both the relationship between demographics and 
phishing susceptibility and the effectiveness of several anti-
phishing educational materials. Our results suggest that 
women are more susceptible than men to phishing and 
participants between the ages of 18 and 25 are more 
susceptible to phishing than other age groups. We explain 
these demographic factors through a mediation analysis. 
Educational materials reduced users’ tendency to enter 
information into phishing webpages by 40% percent; 
however, some of the educational materials we tested also 
slightly decreased participants’ tendency to click on 
legitimate links.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Phishing attacks, in which scammers send emails and other 
messages to con victims into providing their login 
credentials and personal information, snare millions of 
victims each year [12]. A variety of efforts aim to combat 
phishing through law enforcement, automated detection, 
and end-user education. Researchers have studied why 
people fall for phishing attacks; however, little research has 
been done to study demographic factors in susceptibility to 
phishing. By determining which groups are most 
susceptible to phishing, we can determine how best to focus 
anti-phishing education. 
In this paper, we present the results of our roleplay phishing 
study, administered to 1001 online survey respondents in 
order to study demographics and phishing susceptibility. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next 
section, we present background and related work on why 
people fall for phishing. We then describe the design of our 
experiment and present the results of our study, identifying 
several important demographic factors that affect phishing 
susceptibility and describing the effects of education in 
bridging these gaps. Finally, we discuss the limitations of 
our study and the implications of our findings.  
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
Research has shown that people are vulnerable to phishing 
for several reasons. First, people tend to judge a website’s 
legitimacy by its “look and feel,” which attackers can easily 
replicate [2]. Second, many users do not understand or trust 
the security indicators in web browsers [31]. Third, 
although some consumers are aware of phishing, this 
awareness does not reduce their vulnerability or provide 
useful strategies for identifying phishing attacks [3]. Fourth, 
the perceived severity of the consequences of phishing does 
not predict users’ behavior [4].  
Demographics and Phishing Susceptibility 
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no study 
dedicated to understanding what demographic factors 
correlate with falling for phishing and to what extent 
educational interventions have been effective in bridging 
the demographic divide. We highlight here a few studies 
that have measured susceptibility to specific types of 
phishing attacks or have studied the effectiveness of anti-
phishing education while reporting at least some data on 
gender and other demographic factors.  
Jagatic et al. performed a spear phishing experiment at 
Indiana University to quantify how reliable social context 
would increase the success of a phishing attack. They 
launched a phishing attack targeting college students aged 
18–24 years old by using information harvested from social 
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networking sites. In their study, they determined whether 
the 487 participants fell for the attack by observing whether 
participants provided their personal information to the 
phishing website. Female students fell for 77% of the spear 
phishing attacks, while male students fell for 65% [14].  
In a related study, Kumaraguru et al. conducted a real-
world phishing study with 515 participants to study the 
long-term retention of PhishGuru anti-phishing training 
[18]. They did not find significant differences based on 
gender, but did find that participants in the 18-25 age group 
were consistently most vulnerable to phishing attacks.  
Finally, Kumaraguru et al. [16] conducted a study of 5,182 
Internet users measuring the effectiveness of Anti-Phishing 
Phil, an interactive game that teaches people not to fall for 
phish. They found that men were more likely to correctly 
distinguish phishing and legitimate websites than women 
(75.5% correct vs. 64.4% correct). They collected only 
coarse-grained participant age data, but found that people 
under the age of 18 performed worse than those above 18.  
Although past studies have found differences in phishing 
susceptibility based on gender and age, they generally did 
not collect enough information about study participants to 
isolate these variables from other potentially confounding 
factors. In addition, previous studies did not address why 
these demographic factors correlate with falling for 
phishing. In our paper, we address these research questions.   
Susceptibility vs. Risk Behavior  
The risk literature has shown reliable demographic 
differences in risk perceptions on various topics: relatively 
oppressed groups (e.g., women, racial and ethnic minorities, 
and less wealthy people) generally perceive the most risk in 
the world around them [11, 30]. Such perceptions may be 
linked to these groups’ experiences of a riskier world, 
perhaps due to lower degrees of control over risky 
processes. Age has also been linked to risky behavior: on 
average, adolescents tend to engage in riskier behaviors, 
perhaps as a function of their ongoing learning about the 
world [27,6]. Because real-world risk behaviors are 
complex and subject to such varied predictors as 
knowledge, goals, and benefits associated with what is 
perceived to be risky behavior, there have been relatively 
few studies with the power to assess multiple mediators of 
demographic effects on risky behavior. The current paper 
takes a specific, well-defined behavior as a context in which 
to identify specific factors that may explain  these effects.  
Security User Education 
Despite claims by some security and usability experts that 
user education about security does not work [13], there is 
evidence that well-designed user security education can be 
effective in the real world [18]. Web-based training 
materials, contextual training, embedded training, and 
interactive games have all been shown to improve users’ 
ability to avoid phishing attacks [16, 17, 29]. 
A number of organizations have developed online training 
materials to educate users about phishing [7, 9, 22, 23]. In a 
previous study, Kumaraguru et al. tested the effectiveness 
of some of these online materials and found that, while 
these materials could be improved, they are surprisingly 
effective when users actually read them [16].  
Several studies have adopted a contextual training approach 
in which users are sent simulated phishing emails by the 
experimenters to test vulnerability to phishing attacks. At 
the end of the study, users are given materials that inform 
them about phishing attacks. This approach has been used 
in studies involving Indiana University students [15], West 
Point cadets [10], and New York State employees [24].  
A related approach, called embedded training, teaches users 
about phishing during their regular use of email. This 
trainer sends phishing email to users and, if users click on 
phishing links, immediately presents an intervention 
designed to train them to avoid falling for phishing attacks. 
Kumaraguru et al. created several intervention designs 
based on learning sciences, and found that these 
interventions were more effective than standard security 
notices that companies email to their customers [17]. The 
researchers continued to refine the most successful 
intervention, a comic strip featuring a character named 
PhishGuru. A follow-up study showed that people were 
able to retain what they learned from this training [18].  
Finally, Sheng et al. designed Anti-Phishing Phil, an online 
game that teaches users good habits to help them avoid 
phishing attacks. The researchers used learning science 
principles to design and iteratively refine the game. Their 
evaluation showed that participants who played the game 
were better able to identify fraudulent websites compared to 
participants in other conditions [29]. 
We studied the effectiveness of several of these educational 
approaches in bridging the demographic divide, including a 
set of popular web-based training materials, Anti-Phishing 
Phil, a PhishGuru cartoon, and the combination of Anti-
Phishing Phil and a PhishGuru cartoon.  
STUDY DESIGN  
In this online study participants answered survey questions 
to determine their background and assess their knowledge 
about phishing, and completed a roleplay task to assess 
their behavioral susceptibility to phishing prior to receiving 
one of several forms of training. Participants then 
completed a second roleplay task to assess reductions in 
phishing susceptibility as well as any changes in 
participants’ tendencies to be suspicious of legitimate 
emails. Participants were assigned randomly to a control 
condition (no training) or one of four experimental 
conditions that varied based on the type of training to which 
participants were exposed. Half the participants completed 
the roleplay and then the survey questions; the other half 
completed the survey questions prior to the roleplay.  
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Participants were recruited through Amazon.com’s 
Mechanical Turk (mTurk), a marketplace for work 
requiring human intelligence. In this online environment, 
requesters post tasks known as HITs (Human Intelligence 
Tasks), and workers are paid for completing these HITs. 
We offered to pay participants four dollars for those that 
qualified and twenty cents to those who did not. In total, 
1001 participants qualified and completed the entire study.   
To disqualify people who were hoping to earn money for 
completing the study without actually paying attention to 
the study tasks, we asked all participants a series of 
questions about an email message that discussed an 
upcoming meeting. We used two of these questions, both of 
which could be answered correctly by a careful reading of 
the email, to screen out those participants who were not 
paying attention to the email content. We also asked basic 
demographic questions (such as questions about occupation 
and age) so that participants would not be able to easily 
identify qualifying questions [5]. 
Roleplay 
Behavior was measured by performance in a roleplay task, 
with two equivalent exercises administered before and after 
training (the order of which was counterbalanced). This 
task is based on an established roleplay exercise that has 
been shown to have good internal and external validity [4]. 
The benefit of the roleplay is that it enables researchers to 
study phishing without conducting an actual phishing 
attack. Participants were told to assume the role of Pat 
Jones, who works at (fictitious) Baton Rouge University 
and uses the email address patjones@bru.edu for both work 
and personal emails. Each roleplay showed participants 14 
images of emails along with context about Pat Jones that 
may help them to interpret the emails. Images matched the 
participant’s operating system and browser (e.g. Firefox on 
a Mac or Internet Explorer on a PC or other combinations) 
so that all images and cues would be familiar to the 
participant. Participants were asked to indicate how they 
would handle the emails if they received them in their own 
email inbox. Participants were asked to check boxes 
corresponding to all of the actions they would be likely to 
take from a list of responses generated through earlier 
qualitative work [3]:  
•  Reply by email 
•  Contact the sender by phone or in person 
•  Forward the email to someone else 
•  Delete the email 
•  Keep, save or archive the email 
•  Click on the selected link in the email (the one that the 
browser hand is pointing to) 
•  Copy and paste the selected URL (the www address) 
from the email into a web browser, if a URL is selected 
in this email 
•  Type the selected URL into a web browser, if a URL is 
selected in this email 
•  Click on a different link in the email (please specify 
which link(s) you would click on) 
•  Other (please specify) 
 
The first email was created to familiarize the participant 
with the procedure. It was a short message from the same 
domain as Pat’s email address. This message from the BRU 
Information Security Office announced a scavenger hunt 
for National Cyber Security month. The participants 
continued through the roleplay task by viewing a 
combination of real, phishing, malware and spam email 
Email Subject  Legitimacy    Relevant features of email and websites 
Earn Bonus Points #1  real 
win a prize in an online scavenger hunt 
from BRU Information Security Office 
link: https://www.bru.edu/iso/aware/ncsam/hunt/bonus 
Picture from last weekend’s 
party 
possible 
malware 
impersonal greeting 
link:  http://picasaweb.google.com/stevewulitzer/Partypics/ 
actual url:  http://128.3.72.234/Partypics.jpg.exe 
No obligation bankruptcy 
consultation  spam  text of link:  “Apply online now” 
actual url:  https://www.bankruptcylawyerfinder.com/freeconsultation.htm?... 
Bandwidth Quota Offer  phishing 
misspelling in url and .org domain 
link  http://www.brubandwithamnesty.org/bandwidth/agree.htm 
actual url:  same 
eBay Accounts Security  phishing 
threatens account suspension 
link:  https://signin.eBay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignIn&sid=verify … 
actual url:  http://www.security-validation-your-account.com/signin.ebay/… 
Your Amazon.com Order (#103-
0607555-6895008)  real 
problem with shipping 
link: www.amazon.com/help/confirmation 
actual url: same 
Your eBay item sold!  real  text of link:  “Send Invoice Now” 
actual url:  http://payments.ebay.com/eBayISAPI... 
Table 1: A representative sample of emails in Pat’s inbox from one of the roleplays.  
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images. Table 1 lists a representative sample of the emails 
that Pat encounters in one of the roleplays. Each set of 14 
emails included 6 phishing emails, 5 legitimate emails, 2 
spam messages, and 1 possible malware email that 
contained links. Most of the links in these emails, including 
all bru.edu links and all of the phishing links, were fictitious 
links made up for this study. 
As shown in the example email in Figure 1, each email 
contained a link to a web page shown with the mouse 
pointer positioned on the link and the actual URL 
destination displayed in the status bar as it would be if users 
prepared to click on the link on their own computer. For 
individuals who indicated that they would click on the link 
or otherwise end up at the web page, an image of that web 
page was displayed. Each web page requested information 
to be entered and participants were asked to indicate if they 
would click on a link on the page, enter the requested 
information, bookmark the page, visit another related web 
page, close the website, or take other action. No matter 
what other actions the user indicated, those who said that 
they would enter the requested information were coded as 
having fallen for phishing or complied with a legitimate 
email, corresponding to the legitimacy of the email in 
question.  
Education Materials 
Participants were randomly assigned to the control 
condition or to one of the four experimental conditions in 
which they were shown educational materials on ways to 
avoid falling for phishing attacks: a PhishGuru cartoon, 
Anti-Phishing Phil, several popular web-based training 
materials, and a combination of Anti-Phishing Phil plus a 
PhishGuru cartoon.  
For popular web-based training, we selected three consumer 
oriented educational web pages from the first page of 
Google search results using the search query ‘phishing’ —
Microsoft Online safety [22], OnGuardOnline phishing tips 
[25], and National Consumer League Fraud tips [23]. In 
total, these materials have 3107 words, and would take 
roughly 15 minutes to complete reading with a scanning 
speed of 250 words per minute. After participants read each 
of the first two web pages they had a choice of reading 
more information or moving to the next part of the study. 
Participants in the popular training materials condition 
reviewed an average of 1.5 of the three websites and spent 
an average of 1.8 minutes on training. 
In the Anti-Phishing Phil conditions, participants were 
taken through three levels of the game and allowed to exit 
at any point.  On average participants completed 2.7 rounds 
of Phil in a little over 8 minutes. 
The PhishGuru conditions provided participants with one 
page of materials and then participants moved on to the 
next part of the study. Participants in the PhishGuru 
condition spent an average of 0.5 minutes on training. 
All participants who viewed any of the educational 
materials were asked how likely they would be to visit that 
specific educational tool again and how likely they would 
be to recommend it to someone else, on a scale ranging 
from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (extremely likely). 
Previous Experiences and Demographics 
Along with asking participants extensive demographic 
questions, all participants were asked to complete a series 
of questions about their online experiences, including 
questions about their choice of websites for recent 
purchases, their use of online banking and their prior 
exposure to anti-phishing educational materials. 
Participants also indicated relevant negative experiences 
such as having information stolen or compromised in some 
way by entering it into a website. Table 2 presents basic 
demographics of the sample. 
Knowledge and Technical Background  
Knowledge questions prompted participants to choose the 
best definition for four terms related to computer security: 
‘cookie,’ ‘phishing,’ ‘spyware,’ and ‘virus.’ Participants 
were given the same list of eight possible definitions to 
choose from for each, as well as choices to indicate lack of 
familiarity with the word. Each term had one correct answer 
on the list (shown here in parentheses). The options 
included:  
•  Something that protects your computer from 
unauthorized communication outside the network 
•  Something that watches your computer and send that 
information over the Internet (spyware)  
•  Something websites put on your computer so you don't 
have to type in the same information the next time you 
visit (cookie)  
•  Something put on your computer without your 
permission, that changes the way your computer works 
(virus)  
 
Figure 1: A phishing email used in our roleplay.  
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information to thieves (phishing)  
•  Email trying to sell you something  
•  Other software that can protect your computer  
•  Other software that can hurt your computer  
•  I have seen this word before but I don't know what it 
means for computers  
•  I have never seen this word before  
•  Decline to answer  
•  Other (please specify)    
 
To assess the level of their technology background, we 
asked participant if they had an Information Technology-
related degree and any experience with programming 
languages, and they self-rated how technologically savvy 
they were on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all savvy) to 7 
(extremely savvy). 
Risk Perceptions 
To evaluate participants’ risk perceptions, we presented 
them with a series of statements taken from the Domain-
Specific Risk-Taking scale of adult populations 
(DOSPERT) [1], drawing on the categories of financial risk 
and health and safety risk. These questions prompted 
participants to rate the risk associated with activities such as 
betting a day’s income at the horse races and riding a 
motorcycle without a helmet, on a scale ranging from 1 (not 
at all risky) to 7 (extremely risky).   
RESULTS 
In this section we explain how we measured phishing 
susceptibility; describe our regression analysis; and then 
discuss the effects of gender, age, and anti-phishing 
education on phishing susceptibility.  
Measuring Phishing Susceptibility  
We measured participants’ susceptibility to phishing by 
examining two kinds of errors in the roleplay scenarios 
before and after educational interventions: false positives 
and falling for phish. A false positive is when a user 
mistakenly judges a legitimate email or website as a phish 
and refuses to take the desired actions. Falling for phish 
occurs when a phishing email or website is incorrectly 
judged to be legitimate and users click on the email or 
submit information to the website. In some studies, falling 
for phish is determined based on whether users click on 
links in phishing emails; in other studies it is determined 
based on whether they submit information to phishing 
websites. In this study, similar to previous studies, we 
found that about 90% of participants who would click on a 
phishing link would go on to provide information to 
phishing websites [17, 18]. In this paper we focus our 
analysis on the stricter measure — giving information to 
phishing websites — as falling for phish.  
Overall, prior to training, participants indicated they would 
click on 52% of phishing links and provide information to 
47% of phishing websites. These results are similar to a 
previous real-world phishing study [16] in which 52.3% of 
participants clicked on the simulated spear phishing emails 
Characteristics Control  Popular 
training 
materials 
Anti-Phishing 
Phil 
PhishGuru 
Cartoon 
Anti-Phishing 
Phil with 
PhishGuru 
Sample Size  218  217  166 201 199 
Gender         
   Male  50%  48%  54%  45%  45% 
   Female  50%  52%  46%  55%  55% 
Average age in years  30  30  29 30 31 
Education         
   High school or less  10%  8%  7%  7%  8% 
   Some college  33%  32%  37%  39%  36% 
   Competed 4-year college     
   degree 
29%  29%  30% 30% 27% 
   Some Post-graduate  
   education 
11% 12%  10%  6%  10% 
   Have master or PhD degree  17%  19%  16%  18%  17% 
Percentage from US?  74%  71%  73% 78% 80% 
Percentage student?  25%  26%  31% 20% 25% 
Average years on the 
Internet 
13  12  12 13 13 
Average emails per day  44  44  32 57 43 
Table 2: Participant demographics by conditions. 
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and subsequently 40.1% gave information to phishing sites. 
The similarity in our results suggested the validity of the 
roleplay survey instrument.  
We found no significant differences in performance based 
on whether participants completed the survey before or 
after the first roleplay. Therefore we have collapsed those 
conditions and analyzed them together.  
Regression Analysis  
To explore factors that predict phishing susceptibility, we 
performed a multivariate linear regression. This section 
explains the steps we took to build the model and discusses 
the results from the linear regression. 
We used factor analysis to reduce the dimensionality of our 
variables on participants’ online experience (eight 
variables), participants’ technical knowledge and 
experience (five variables), and participants’ risk perception 
(12 variables). The factor analysis, using principle 
component and varimax rotation, reduced our list of 
variables from 40 to 22.  
To study age groups and their vulnerability to phishing, we 
mapped age to the following categories: 18-25, 26-35, 36-
45, 46-55, and >56.  
We then ran the regression predicting falling for phish from 
the 22 variables. In Table 3 we report variables that are 
statistically significant at p <= 0.01. Participants’ degree of 
prior exposure to anti-phishing education significantly 
predicts their phishing susceptibility (B = 0.189, p <0.01). 
Participants who had previous anti-phishing training 
(56.6% of total participants) fell for 40% of the phish in the 
roleplay, whereas those who had no previous anti-phishing 
training fell for 60% of phishing websites (t(896) = -9.02, p 
< 0.001). This factor had the most impact on phishing 
susceptibility, suggesting that exposure to education may 
play a larger role than other important factors. 
Women fell for significantly more phish than men (B = 
0.140, t = 3.98, p < 0.01), an average of 53.1%, compared 
to just 41% for men (t(981) = -5.48, p < 0.001). We explore 
reasons for women’s greater susceptibility in the next 
section. 
Participants’ age linearly predicts their susceptibility to 
phishing (B = -0.116, p < 0.01). An analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) comparing age groups found a significant 
overall effect (F(4, 996) = 9.65, p < 0.001) driven by 
participants aged 18 to 25 falling for phishing more than 
other age groups (all post-hoc tests comparing this group to 
other groups significant at p < 0.01; no other groups were 
significantly different from one another). 
Participants’ self-rated knowledge about technology also 
significantly predicts whether they will fall for phishing. 
For each standard deviation increase in their technical 
knowledge score, participants fell for 3.6% fewer phish.  
Finally, participants’ risk aversion, as measured by 
reactions to risks of financial investments, also predicts 
whether they will fall for phishing. The more risk-averse a 
participant is, the less likely he or she will fall for phish. 
For each standard deviation increase in their risk perception 
score, participants fell for 2.8% fewer phish. 
Gender and Falling for Phish  
In order to better understand why women appear to be more 
susceptible to phishing, we examined the effect of gender 
on clicking on phishing links, giving information to 
phishing websites, clicking on legitimate URLs, and giving 
information to legitimate websites. 
We found that, before training, women were more likely 
than men to click on phishing links and enter information 
on phishing websites. On average, women clicked on 
54.7% of phishing emails, compared to just 49% for men 
(t(981) = 2.69, p < 0.01). After clicking on a phishing link, 
women continued on to give information to the 
corresponding phishing website 97% of the time, compared 
to 84% for men (t(981) = 5.42, p < 0.001). This further 
exacerbates the gender differences in clicking on links.  
In an attempt to explain these gender effects, we did a 
mediation analysis using all the key predictors as potential 
mediators. Mediation analysis explains “how” an effect 
occurred by hypothesizing a causal sequence. The basic 
mediation model is a causal sequence in which the 
independent variable (X) causes the mediator(s) (M) which 
in turn causes the dependent variable (Y), therefore 
explaining how X had its effect on Y [19, 20]. Mediational 
processes are common in basic and applied psychology. 
We used the multiple mediator model developed by 
Preacher and Hayers [26] for our mediation analysis. For 
gender, we used technical knowledge and technical training 
as mediators; our hypothesis is that women have less 
technical experience than men and therefore fall for 
phishing more. Our results support this hypothesis.  We 
report the mediation statistics in Table 4 and illustrate the 
results of the analysis graphically in Figure 2.  
  
Model Parameters  Standardized 
Coefficients 
Prior exposure to anti-phishing 
training 
0.19 
Gender  0.14
Age   -0.12
Participants’ technical knowledge  -0.10 
Risk perception for financial 
investment 
-0.08 
Table 3:  Regression analysis with parameters that are 
significant at p < 0.01 
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for phishing drops from a total effect of 0.72, p < 0.01, 
down to a direct effect of just 0.43, p < 0.01. The difference 
between these effects represents the total indirect effect 
through the two mediators, with a point estimate of 0.29, 
and a 95% CI of 0.18 to 0.42 (see Table 4). Thus, women in 
our study have less technical training and have less 
technical knowledge than men, which appears to partially 
account for their greater susceptibility to phishing. 
The mediation relationship is only partial, as the direct 
effect is still statistically significant. This partiality suggests 
that there are other factors that are not captured by our 
survey instruments; these factors might be explored in 
future work.  
We included several other predictors that did not mediate 
this relationship. For example, women may fall for phishing 
more because they have fewer opportunities or are less 
motivated to learn about phishing. However, while women 
in our study had less technical training than men, more 
women than men claimed to have had prior exposure to 
anti-phishing education in particular. Thus, prior exposure 
to anti-phishing education did not turn out to be a 
significant mediator. Neither income nor education were 
significant mediators for the effect of gender on phishing 
susceptibility. 
Other factors that we did not measure might potentially 
explain the remaining tendency for women in our study to 
be more susceptible to phishing than men.  Factors that may 
be worth further exploration include differences in the way 
men and women use the Internet, differences in the way 
 
  Point 
estimates  Percentile 95% CI
   Lower  Upper 
Total Effect of gender 
on falling for phishing  0.72    
Total effect of various 
mediators   0.29 0.18 0.42 
Tech knowledge  0.17  0.10  0.27 
Tech training  0.12  0.02  0.21 
Table 4: Total effect of gender on falling for phishing and  
effect of various mediators that are significant at p < 0.01. 
The total effect is quantified with the unstandardized 
regression coefficient. The effect of various mediators is 
quantified as the product of coefficients in the paths shown 
in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 3: Mediation analysis for gender. Each path is 
quantified with unstandardized regression coefficients. The 
direct effect of gender on phishing susceptibility (measured 
by number of phishing websites participants’ giving 
information to) is calculated as total effect minus all the 
effect through each of the mediators, which is calculated as 
the product of coefficients in the paths. 
Figure 2: Mediating the effect of age with prior exposure to 
training, education, years on the Internet and risk 
perception for financial investment. Each of the paths is 
quantified with unstandardized regression coefficients.    
 
 
  Point 
estimates  Percentile 95% CI
   Lower  Upper 
Total Effect of age on 
falling for phishing  0.34    
Total effect of various 
mediators   0.23 0.16 0.29 
Exposed to training 
before  0.08 0.04 0.12 
Years on Internet  0.08  0.03  0.13 
Education 0.05  0.02  0.08 
Risk financial 
investing  0.02 0.00 0.04 
Table 5: Total effect of age on falling for phishing and the 
effect of various mediators that are statistically significant 
at p < 0.01. 
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men and women make trust decisions, and differences in 
the tendency of men and women to be cooperative or 
comply with instructions.  
Age and Falling for Phish  
As described above, people in the 18–25 age group were 
more likely to fall for phish than people of other ages. We 
used the multiple mediator model to determine why 
younger people are more susceptible to phishing. We report 
the mediation statistics in Table 5 and Figure 3. 
Taken as a set, participants’ prior exposure to phishing, 
number of years on the Internet, perception of financial 
risk, and education mediate the effect of age on falling for 
phishing. As can be seen in Figure 3, the total effect of age 
on falling for phishing fell from 0.34, p < 0.01, down to 
0.12 (not significant).  The difference between the total and 
direct effects is the total indirect effect through the four 
mediators, with a point estimate of 0.23, and a 95% CI of 
0.16 to 0.29 (see Table 5).  Because younger people have a 
lower level of education, fewer years of experience with the 
Internet, less exposure to training material, and less of an 
aversion to financial risks, they tend to be more susceptible 
to phishing. 
Effects of Anti-Phishing Education  
Before training, participants on average fell for 47% of 
phishing websites. After the training, this number reduced 
to 28%, a 40% improvement.  
Table 6 summarizes the roleplay results by condition, 
before and after training. All training materials reduced 
participants’ tendency to enter information into phishing 
webpages by about 34 to 44 percent, while there was no 
statistically significant improvement for the control group 
(F(3,778) = 2.22,  p =0.84).  
Anti-Phishing Phil, the Phishguru cartoon and Anti-
Phishing Phil with the Phishguru cartoon did not decrease 
participants’ tendency to click on legitimate links and go to 
legitimate websites. However, in the popular training 
condition, participants’ tendency to click on legitimate links 
was slightly reduced, (t(216) = 2.01, p < 0.05), suggesting 
that the participants may learn an avoidance strategy from 
popular training materials rather than strategies for better 
detection.  
Since the various education materials perform similarly in 
reducing the number of people who fall for phishing, we 
combined all the training conditions together in order to 
study the effect of education in bridging demographic gaps.   
We found that women in the training conditions learned 
more than men about avoiding phishing links (t(767) = 5.63 
p < 0.01); after training, women and men performed equally 
well in not clicking on phishing links in emails     (t(767) = 
-0.05,  p = 0.96). However, women and men learned 
similarly about entering information into phishing websites 
(t(767) = -1.51, p  = 0.13). Thus, both before and after 
training women were more likely than men to go on to enter 
information into phishing websites (t(767) = -4.22, p  < 
0.001).  
Finally, people of different age groups learned similarly 
from training, leaving no statistical difference between age 
groups’ performance increase (F(4,778) = 1.66, p = 0.16). 
Participants between the ages of 18 and 25 were the most 
susceptible group in the first roleplay, and they remained 
more susceptible to phishing in the second roleplay. People 
in different education groups also learned similarly, 
(F(5,763) = 1.4, p = 0.20). We found no significant effect 
for education or race.  
DISCUSSION  
We conclude with a discussion of our study limitations and 
a summary of findings. 
Limitations 
There are several limitations to the current study.  First, the 
sample was drawn from mTurk users and is not expected to 
be representative of the larger population of email users. 
Our sample of mTurk users tends to be younger, more 
educated, and more tech-savvy than the general public. 
A second limitation of this study is the lack of direct 
consequences for user behavior. Participants might be more 
willing to engage in risky behavior in this roleplay if they 
feel immune to any negative outcomes that may ensue.   
Similarly, participants are not risking opportunity costs 
from being too conservative in their behavior. However, 
there is no reason to believe that the predictors described 
here should differ in their relationship to roleplay behavior 
compared to real-world behavior. 
Summary of findings  
Prior exposure to phishing education is associated with less 
susceptibility to phishing, suggesting that phishing 
Giving info 
to phishing 
sites 
Clicking on 
legitimate 
websites 
Condition 
1st 
role
play 
2nd 
role
play 
1st 
role 
play 
2nd 
role 
play 
Control 50%  47%  70%  74% 
Popular training  46%  26%  67%  61% 
Anti-Phishing Phil  46%  29%  73%  73% 
PhishGuru Cartoon  47%  31%  70%  64% 
Anti-Phishing Phil 
with Phishguru 
cartoon 
47% 26% 68% 59% 
Table 6: Roleplay results by condition.  
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380education may be an effective tool. Also, more risk-averse  
participants tended to fall for fewer phish.  
Gender and age are two key demographics that predict 
phishing susceptibility. Specifically, women click on links 
in phishing emails more often than men do, and also are 
much more likely than men to continue on to give 
information to phishing websites. In part, this difference 
appears to be because women have less technical training 
and less technical knowledge than men. There is also a 
significant effect for age: participants aged between ages 18 
and 25 are much more likely than others to fall for phishing 
(as seen by other researchers). This group appears to be 
more susceptible because participants in this age group 
have a lower level of education, fewer years on the Internet, 
less exposure to training materials, and less of an aversion 
to risks. Educators can bridge this gap by providing anti-
phishing education to high school and college students. 
All of the education materials in our study reduce users’ 
tendency to enter information into phishing webpages by 
40%. However, some education materials decreased 
participants’ tendency to click on legitimate links; this 
finding suggests that educators need to do a better job of 
teaching people how to distinguish phish from non-phish so 
that they avoid false positives.   
Demographics such as age, gender, race, and education do 
not affect the amount of learning, suggesting that good 
training materials can provide benefit for all groups. 
However, while the 40% reduction in phishing 
susceptibility after training is substantial, even after training 
participants fell for 28% of the phishing messages in our 
roleplay. This finding shows that education is effective and 
needed but is not a cure-all.  
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